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REASONED DECISION-MAKING FOR LEGAL
ETHICS REGULATION
John S. Dzienkowski* & John M. Golden**
Many lawyers and scholars have criticized the ethics rules developed by
the organized legal profession to regulate the practice of law. Complaints
about processes for generating new ethics rules and ethics opinions
interpreting ethics rules commonly reflect concerns about failures to engage
in reasoned decision-making. Rationales for the proposed rules or the
opinions proffered by bar associations, courts, or agencies are often
incomplete or inadequately supported, and one must imagine that the quality
of resulting rules or their interpretations often suffers. We argue that
administrative law provides a model for how courts can address such
concerns—a model that courts, both federal and state, already follow in
demanding and encouraging reasoned decision-making by administrative
agencies.
This Article examines two principal administrative law
approaches that courts should adopt. First, even in areas where courts are
manifestly inexpert relative to administrative agencies, they have insisted on
giving agency rules a “hard look” for confirmation that the agency properly
justified the rules at the time of issuance, that the agency issued the rules
through a process that gave interested parties a meaningful opportunity to
comment and make suggestions, and that the agency properly considered
such inputs as well as the whole of the evidence before it. Second, courts
have often accorded weight to agency opinions on questions such as statutory
interpretation, with the weight accorded dependent on the nature of the
agency’s process in generating such an interpretation. In the ethics context,
courts can act similarly to promote reasoned decision-making by (1) giving
an analog of “hard look” review to rules proffered by bar associations
before adopting them and (2) giving bar associations’ ethics opinions only a
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degree of weight that they merit through high quality process and on-therecord reasoning. By adopting these two approaches to considering the
adoption and interpretation of ethics rules, courts can help bring about
significant improvements to processes for drafting, adopting, and
interpreting ethics rules.
INTRODUCTION
The American legal profession relies on a system for drafting, considering,
and adopting ethics rules for lawyers that has both centralized and
decentralized aspects. The American Bar Association (ABA) has positioned
itself as a centralized promulgator of model ethics codes for over one hundred
years.1 Despite criticism of the ABA’s work, the organization’s ethics codes
are highly influential in setting the agendas for federal and state courts and
agencies.2 Once model codes are adopted by the ABA House of Delegates,
many state and federal courts and agencies engage in decentralized processes
of considering the codes’ formal adoption in their jurisdictions. Moreover,
once a model code is adopted as law, federal and state authorities often rely
on opinion-writing committees of the ABA or state professional associations
for interpretive guidance.
Complaints about processes for generating new ethics rules or ethics
opinions interpreting ethics rules commonly reflect concerns about failures
to engage in reasoned decision-making. Rationales for the proposed rules or
the opinions proffered by bar associations can sometimes be incomplete or
based on inadequate research or information, and one must imagine that the
quality of resulting rules or their interpretations at least sometimes suffers.
We argue that administrative law provides a model for how courts can
address such concerns—a model that courts, both federal and state, already
follow in demanding and encouraging reasoned decision-making by
administrative agencies.
We propose that, in considering the adoption and interpretation of ethics
rules, courts adopt two approaches to rulemaking already used in the
administrative law context. First, even in areas where courts are manifestly
inexpert relative to administrative agencies, they have insisted on giving
agency rules a “hard look” for confirmation that the agency properly justified
the rules at the time of issuance,3 that the agency issued the rules through a
process that gave interested parties a meaningful opportunity to comment and
1. See, e.g., CANONS OF PRO. ETHICS (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908); MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP.
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1980); MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
2. Over time, from the Canons of Professional Ethics, to the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, states have introduced more
variations from ABA language in their local versions. One can speculate that such variations
arise because local practice has diverged from the national norm and because states value their
judgments over the goal of national uniformity.
3. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (explaining that, even under the deferential “‘arbitrary and
capricious’ standard” of review, an “agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action”).
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make suggestions,4 and that the agency properly considered such inputs as
well as the whole of the evidence before it.5 Second, courts often accord
weight to agency opinions on questions such as statutory interpretation, with
the weight accorded reflecting aspects of the quality of the agency’s process
in generating such an interpretation.6 In considering the adoption and
interpretation of rules of ethics, courts can act similarly by (1) giving an
analog of “hard look” review to rules proffered by bar associations before
adopting them or perhaps even after their initial adoption and (2) giving bar
associations’ ethics opinions only the degree of weight that they merit
through high quality process and on-the-record reasoning.
Part I provides an overview of the nature of legal ethics rulemaking and its
history in the United States. Because this overview may suggest the
desirability of more radical reforms, a caveat regarding limitations of our
analysis in Parts III and IV is in order. In these parts, we generally assume
that processes of ethics rule drafting and opinion writing will continue to be
performed by bar associations or court-appointed committees, with ultimate
and definitive approval of association-proposed rules or positions coming
through the courts. We focus on how this judiciary-plus-association process
may be improved.
Despite substantial reasons to suspect the wisdom of entrusting a variant
of self-regulatory responsibility to the bar in having it effectively draft rules
for itself,7 we believe that (1) this approach has some immediate advantages8
4. See, e.g., United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977)
(requiring disclosure of data on which the agency relied in order to permit “meaningful
comment” in response to notice of rulemaking); Emily S. Bremer, The Exceptionalism Norm
in Administrative Adjudication, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 1351, 1363–64 (“[T]he judicial
requirement that an agency’s final rule be a ‘logical outgrowth’ of its proposed rule is designed
to ensure the proper functioning and integrity of the notice-and-comment process.”).
5. See David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the
Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 318 (2010) (describing “‘hard look’ review” as “demand[ing]
that agencies offer thorough justifications for the rules that they promulgate, including
responses to any meaningful objections or alternatives aired during the comment period”).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (“The fair measure
of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with
circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency,
formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”).
7. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks,
Ethics Walks, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 257–58 (1996) (noting the potential collusion of the
plaintiff’s and defense bars in relation to ABA ethics opinions, as “[t]he financial benefits
flowing from expansion of the tort system do not redound exclusively to the benefit of plaintiff
attorneys”); see also Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation:
Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L.
REV. 1167, 1175 (2003) (arguing that legislative bodies would “more likely produce publicminded regulation and limit lawyer rent-seeking”).
8. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern
Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
460, 467 (1996) (concluding that there is “substantial wisdom to the tradition of disinterested
judicial regulation of the bar” compared to regulation by administrative agencies, who tend to
have their own, pro-government interests); Ted Schneyer, Legal Process Scholarship and the
Regulation of Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 41 (1996) (“The view that legislatures and
executive-branch agencies are better occupational rulemakers than either the judiciary or a
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and (2) its current entrenchment means that it makes sense to consider how
to improve it, at least as a provisional measure, rather than simply skipping
to questions of what might best replace it. Also, rule drafting and approval
and opinion writing at the ABA may benefit from a recognition that ABA
rules and opinions will be considered under processes and scrutiny used in
the administrative law context.9 We also recognize that in recent years, the
ABA’s inability to adopt rules in certain areas has forced the states to
consider such topics on their own. In such circumstances, the consideration
of issues by the decentralized authorities of federal and state courts and
agencies may benefit from our proposal.
I. BAR-MEDIATED PROCESSES FOR ETHICS RULEMAKING
Early lawyer codes in the United States were a product of guild efforts to
protect the image of the profession and establish self-regulation of its
members.10 In 1887, the Alabama State Bar issued a code of ethics relying
on leading nineteenth-century concepts of the duties of lawyers.11 The ABA,
formed by elite lawyers, followed the guild approach of professions to adopt
the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics, largely based on the Alabama
code.12 The ABA’s view that it should produce model rules for the states to
adopt continues to dominate the origin of ethics rules adopted in the states
even today.
The promulgation of codes was only a part of the efforts to design a
regulatory system beholden to the guidance of the ABA. An aspect of the
ABA view was a decentralized approach to lawyer regulation, with each state
giving a substantial role to its local bar.13 By advocating for each state to
create a bar agency to implement the day-to-day regulation of lawyers, it
standardized its model throughout the United States and facilitated the

peak professional association, however sound as a generalization, is not necessarily sound
when it comes to setting standards for law practice.”).
9. When the ABA undertakes a comprehensive review of its model ethics codes, the
commissions often use committees, reports, hearings, and comment processes, but such
procedural steps and review are often omitted or significantly limited when the ABA is making
incremental modifications to certain rules. See, e.g., About the Model Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_o
f_professional_conduct [https://perma.cc/84N6-32GT] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (detailing
the most recent changes to the Model Rules). Also, the ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, the committee with authority to issue opinions on codes of
ethics for lawyers and judges, generally does not use notice-and-comment processes in its
opinion-writing process. Its opinions vary in their scope and reliance on authority.
10. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 96, 303–05 (2d ed. 1985)
(detailing the public’s resentment against lawyers in the early colonial period).
11. See generally CAROL RICE ANDREWS ET AL., GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS: ESSAYS ON
THOMAS GOODE JONES’ 1887 CODE AND THE REGULATION OF THE PROFESSION (2003).
12. The writings of Judge George Sharswood of Pennsylvania and Baltimore lawyer and
teacher, David Hoffman, were significant influences on the ABA’s adoption of the 1908
Canons. See Thomas L. Shaffer, David Hoffman’s Law School Lectures, 1822–1833, 32 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 127, 128 (1982).
13. See Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules, 59 TEX. L. REV.
639, 651 (1981).
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dependence of the local judiciary on the state bar.14 The ABA realized that
judges had significant authority over the practice of law and that, by assisting
them to create an agency to handle the regulation of the profession, the ABA
could facilitate its regulatory agenda.15 Further, the vesting of regulatory
power in the judiciary would discourage other government entities from
becoming involved in the regulation of lawyers.16 We use the term “barmediated process” to refer to the process that the ABA favored in adopting
rules of ethics throughout the country—state court deference to bar
associations and appointed committees dominated by lawyers for the drafting
processes, with the ultimate authority for approval residing in the high court
in the state.
In the ABA, development of major rule revisions has been delegated to a
commission formed for that purpose, whereas narrow rule changes often
come from the various sections of the organization.17 The commissions
tasked with major revisions have often held hearings, published working
papers, and proposed drafts.18 Ultimately, the adoption of the change must
receive an affirmative vote from the House of Delegates, a body including
lawyers and judges from across the country that has a wide array of practice
experiences.19 Although this diversity can give the House the benefit of a
wide range of opinions, it can also be a significant obstacle to major reform.20
Often, outside professional groups of lawyers have promoted changes
consistent with their groups’ interests, and in some cases, these groups have
successfully influenced ABA action.21 In some cases, reform has resulted
14. One might have thought that advocating for a national bar would be more effective in
regulating the legal profession, but decentralization gives the ABA a key role as a centralizing
force with stronger coordination, staffing, and funding relative to states than would likely be
the case relative to a federal-government-regulated bar.
15. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 46 (1989) (examining the ABA support
for integrated bar associations).
16. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 810
n.36 (1992).
17. See Policy & Initiatives, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/policy [https://perma.cc/4FK7-FKJ3] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021)
(listing changes to the Model Rules and documents relating to their background).
18. See generally James Podgers, Come the Evolution: Ethics 20/20 Proposals Seek to
Adapt Existing Professional Conduct Rules, 98 A.B.A. J. 26 (2012) (detailing the Commission
on Ethics 20/20’s revisions in light of recent trends in technology and globalization).
19. See FAQS: The House of Delegates, AM. BAR ASS’N (2019), https://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house_of_delegates/house-publications/
hod-faqs-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/8X9D-44R6].
20. See generally John S. Dzienkowski, Ethical Decisionmaking and the Design of Rules
of Ethics, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 55 (2013). The ABA has been unable to deal with nonlawyer
involvement in the practice of law and in globalization of the practice of law. Id. at 88–90.
21. In 1980, the Roscoe Pound American Trial Lawyers Foundation formed a commission
to draft an alternative to the ABA Kutak Commission’s drafts that eventually became the
Model Rules. See Monroe H. Freedman, The Influence of the American Lawyers’ Code of
Conduct on ABA Rules and Standards, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 927, 927 (2010). In 2014, the
Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers (APRL) formed a committee to study
disciplinary violations involving lawyer advertising in the states and developed proposals for
an amended set of rules. See Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers Applauds
ABA’s Changes to Lawyer Advertising Rules, APRL (Aug. 8, 2018),
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from pressure from Congress in a time of crisis, with the ABA’s reform
efforts serving to limit external regulatory intrusion into the rulemaking
process. Initially, the ABA codes focused on preserving the status of lawyers
in representing clients and as substantially self-regulating actors in the legal
system, but when courts began to use ethics codes for disqualification,
sanctions, and standards of conduct in malpractice, the ABA had to change
its focus to understand the new role of its model rules in the practice of law.22
In most states, the state constitution or the inherent power of the judiciary
places the control of the legal profession in the high court.23 Thus, those
courts remain an important source for designing and implementing rules of
ethics.24 Judges are called on to supervise the drafting, consideration, and
adoption of ethics rules used in court and disciplinary proceedings, as well
as to guide lawyers in representing clients in litigation and nonlitigation
matters.25 Of course, judges have other work to do, and the ABA’s
centralized nature and national reach have given it a significant capacity to
set the agenda for states through the ABA model codes.26 Moreover, the
ABA expends significant resources lobbying states to follow its lead and
tracking its progress.27 In most states, the ABA models are the starting point

https://aprl.net/association-of-professional-responsibility-lawyers-applauds-abas-changes-tolawyer-advertising-rules [https://perma.cc/R5CK-P7XN]. The APRL proposals examined an
area previously addressed by the ABA through minor changes over the years, and this effort
pushed the ABA to adopt more systemic changes for regulation of lawyer advertising and
solicitation. Id.
22. See Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677, 688–89 (1989). For a view praising
the ABA’s efforts to help courts and lawmakers and thereby benefit the rule of law, see
Stephen Gillers, How to Make Rules for Lawyers: The Professional Responsibility of the
Legal Profession, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 365 (2013).
23. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.2.3 (1986) (describing the
inherent powers doctrine).
24. See Eli Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 149, 154–57
(2010) (examining the authority of judges to promulgate rules of conduct).
25. Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal
Ethics—the Modern Era (pt. 2), 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 207 (2002) (“The regulatory
apparatus is both supported by and moved forward through a system of administrative and
judicial rulemaking . . . .”).
26. Many states only consider amendments to the rules when the ABA amends its model
codes. See Amon Burton, The Legacy of Ethics 2000: Progress Toward Greater Uniformity
in State Ethics Rules, 55 ADVOC. (TEX.) 24, 25 (2011) (noting that forty-five states revised
their ethics rules in response to the ABA’s Ethics 2000 Commission effort). Other states, such
as Florida and New York, consider amendments to their rules in light of supreme court and
bar interest outside of any ABA amendments. See, e.g., Proposed Changes to Florida Bar
Rules,
SUNETHICS,
http://www.sunethics.com/proposed-amendments-to-rpc.html
[https://perma.cc/NQY8-ETSM] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (listing annual proposals to amend
the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct); Preface to the 2020–2021 Edition of ROY D.
SIMON, SIMON’S NEW YORK RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ANNOTATED, Westlaw
(database updated Dec. 2020) (describing significant changes in New York professional
responsibility codes).
27. See Policy & Initiatives, supra note 17 (describing the ABA’s Center for Professional
Responsibility Policy Implementation Committee as “provid[ing] assistance to jurisdictions
on the review and implementation of adopted policy, promot[ing] of policy to the bar and the
public, and maintain[ing] a national clearinghouse of information on implementation efforts”).
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for analysis, but in some states, local practices and laws receive more
attention.28 There is some variation in the processes for drafting,
considering, and adopting these rules. For example, the Supreme Court of
Texas submits major changes to a referendum vote of the state’s lawyers, but
minor changes are implemented by the high court directly.29 By contrast, in
most states, the highest courts exercise their inherent authority and directly
adopt their codes of conduct.
Further, most state courts appoint one or more committees to make a
proposal to the court.30 In states with unified or mandatory bar associations,
the court may use state bar committees to consider the adoption of ethics
rules.31 In states with voluntary bar associations, the court may rely on an
agency responsible for regulating the practice of law or appoint committees
as part of its inherent power to regulate the practice of law.32 Ultimately, the
limited resources and personnel of high courts constrain the processes that
can be undertaken in the adoption process. In rare circumstances in some
states, the legislatures intrude on the regulation of lawyers, either through
sunset review of the state bar agency or through legislation applied to
lawyers.33 Sometimes laws are directed at lawyer conduct, and other times

28. One example in which state variations continue to dominate is the lawyer’s duty of
confidentiality to clients. See Att’ys’ Liab. Assurance Soc’y, Inc., Disclosure of Client
Confidences (2019), reprinted in THOMAS D. MORGAN, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT AND OTHER SELECTED STANDARDS 133 app. A (2020). In part, this is because the
duty to disclose client confidences may be derived from case law authority and in part because
individual states have made policy decisions that preventing bodily crimes is more important
than protecting attorney-client confidences.
29. See Proposed Amendments to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct,
STATE BAR OF TEX. https://www.texasbar.com/AM/PrinterTemplate.cfm?Section=
Grievance_Info_and_Ethics_Helpline&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=112
91&FuseFlag=1 [https://perma.cc/D6U7-H4HR] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (describing the
process for consideration of rule amendments); see also Order Amending Comments to the
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and the Texas Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure (Tex. Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1332594/169032.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ATD9-UY9T].
30. For an example of state supreme court consideration of ethics rules through the
commission process, see Rules Revision, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://www.calbar.ca.gov/
Attorneys/Conduct-Discipline/Ethics/Committees/Rules-Revision [https://perma.cc/LUW9U4DG] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (discussing California commissions used to draft, debate,
and propose rule changes).
31. A majority of states have unified or mandatory bar associations to which lawyers
licensed to practice in the state must belong. See Kevin J. Robinson, President’s Page: A
Unified Front: The Need for Mandatory Bar Associations, W. VA. LAW., July–Sept. 2014, at
6, 6 (noting that thirty-three jurisdictions have a mandatory bar association); see also Terry
Radtke, Note, The Last Stage in Reprofessionalizing the Bar: The Wisconsin Bar Integration
Movement, 1934–1956, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 1001 (1998) (examining the politics of the unified
bar movement in the United States). These bar associations blend a number of regulatory and
lawyer support functions under one organization.
32. For example, in 2018, California split the bar functions into a mandatory regulatory
authority, a redefined State Bar of California, and a voluntary authority called the California
Lawyers Association. See About CLA, CAL. LAWS. ASS’N, https://calawyers.org/cla/about-cla
[https://perma.cc/8BJ9-PHC4] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
33. See, e.g., Joe B. Cannon, Sunset and the State Bar, 41 TEX. BAR J. 807 (1978)
(describing the legislatively enacted sunset review of the Texas bar’s authority).
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the general laws are intended to apply to the legal profession.34 The
interaction of statutes and bar regulations is often piecemeal and
uncoordinated.35
In the federal system, courts tend to defer either to the state in which the
court sits or to the ABA rules.36 Efforts to create a federal set of ethics rules
have failed.37 One might have expected that the federal courts would use the
Judicial Conference of the United States to lead an effort to create ethics
rules. Instead, the different circuits have created their own interpretations of
rules on conflicts, confidentiality, and candor.38 Some provisions with
federal and constitutional implications have made their way into federal
codes of procedure and evidence.39 Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court has
weighed in on lawyer conduct issues in the criminal area because of the
constitutional implications.40 Congress has chosen to regulate lawyers acting
in areas of federal interest,41 and federal agencies have often exercised their
authority to regulate those who practice before them, with the Supremacy
Clause overriding state regulatory provisions in such contexts. But even at
the federal administrative level, there is significant deference to the ABA and
the state ethics codes.
This brief survey of the manner in which ethics rules are drafted,
considered, and enacted demonstrates weaknesses in these processes that
result in a less than socially optimal set of ethics rules for lawyers.42 The
ABA, as a professional organization, can naturally be expected to protect the
interests of its members and the profession.43 Drafting and adoption
34. In some cases, a state statute on consumer protection or arbitration might be applied
to the practice of law. Alternatively, a state legislature may enact a law explicitly designed to
regulate lawyers. California, in its Business and Professions Code, exemplifies extensive
legislative regulation of the practice of law. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6067–6228 (West
2020).
35. But one could ask whether legislatures should take a more active role in regulating
lawyers. See Barton, supra note 7, at 1221; Wald, supra note 24, at 158.
36. See Judith A. McMorrow, The (F)Utility of Rules: Regulating Attorney Conduct in
Federal Court Practice, 58 SMU L. REV. 3, 6 (2005).
37. See McMorrow, supra note 36, at 10–19 (2005); Note, Uniform Federal Rules of
Attorney Conduct: A Flawed Proposal, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2063, 2072 (1998).
38. See H. Geoffrey Moulton Jr., Federalism and Choice of Law in the Regulation of
Legal Ethics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 73, 97–98 (1997).
39. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (setting the standard for attorney filings in federal court);
id. r. 26(b) (defining the work product doctrine for lawyers); FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c)(2)
(requiring a court to inquire into conflicts in multiple client representation in criminal cases).
40. Lawyers who represent criminal defendants must meet the Sixth Amendment’s
requirement of effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984) (setting the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
41. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335
(1994) (examining the manner in which Congress could choose to federalize the ethics rules
in the United States).
42. See John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 959–61 (2009)
(identifying five trends resulting from the fragmentation of the law governing lawyers).
43. See MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS 9–63 (1977); MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 11–
356 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils trans., 1954) (1925). Specific institutional goals have
changed over time, influencing the drafting agenda for code reforms. For example, in some
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processes can lead to overregulation to protect certain segments of the bar
and underregulation in areas in which agreement is difficult to reach. The
results have sometimes included rules that promote lawyers’ interests over
the interests of the justice system or clients;44 rules that embrace lawyercentric concepts, such as zealous advocacy, that may be inconsistent with
modern norms of dispute resolution;45 and rules that protect the profession’s
reliance on hourly and contingent fee billing for law firm profits.46 Resulting
rules can also be less clear than is socially desirable, in part to enable lawyers
to shoehorn preexisting conduct into a rule’s allowances.47 Further, the
processes for drafting and adopting rules may not be transparent and may not
include the input of a sufficiently representative array of affected individuals
and entities. Moreover, the rules may be based on beliefs and norms that
have not withstood the scrutiny of empirical analysis and data collection.48
One might view the independence of the judiciary as a possible check on
the system, but courts have naturally tended to focus on adjudication of
disputes rather than ethics rulemaking. Judicial involvement in the
promulgation of rules of conduct is largely supervisory and nominal.49 Parts
III and IV will explore how state judiciaries can improve their supervision of
rulemaking and encourage better quality contributions by bar associations to
rule interpretation. But this part’s discussion—understood in the context of
the judiciary’s comparatively limited resources, expertise, and interest,50
along with the difficulties state courts face in offering uniform and
widespread standards—may suggest more radical reform, involving
significantly more federal involvement in the coordination and oversight of
the development of general legal ethics rules. The suggestion for following
years, ABA presidents have focused rules reform efforts on globalization of the profession,
and in others, they have focused such efforts on the increased use of technology. See Podgers,
supra note 18, at 26–27.
44. Gillers, supra note 22, at 377–87 (examining early cases of the bar placing lawyers’
interests over the interests of the justice system or clients).
45. See generally John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyering in a Hybrid Adversary System, 38 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 45 (1996) (examining the effect of the adversary model on dispute
resolution).
46. For example, Model Rule 1.5(c) permits a law firm to calculate the contingent fee
before deducting the expenses advanced by the firm as long as it is clearly stated in the written
agreement. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.5(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). The effort to
protect attorneys’ fees is understandable given the economic pressures that lawyers face from
increased competition. See THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 207–13
(2010); see also MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.5(c).
47. For example, Model Rule 1.9’s “substantially related” test for deciding whether a
lawyer can accept a new representation against the interests of a former client is vague and
subject to many different interpretations. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.9.
48. In considering the involvement of nonlawyers in the practice of law, the ABA has not
conducted empirical research on the jurisdictions that permit limited nonlawyer involvement
in law practice to determine what problems, if any, these practices have imposed on clients
and the system of justice.
49. See Wald, supra note 24, at 155 (describing the role of judges as nominal despite the
rhetoric that judges have the exclusive power to regulate lawyers).
50. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 670 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that
legal ethics was the “least analytically rigorous and hence most subjective of law-school
subjects”).
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an administrative law model—and in large part a federal administrative law
model—for the review of new ethics rules and the assignment of weight to
bar associations’ ethics opinions might be viewed as an intermediate step to
consideration of such broader reform that could open the way to a
significantly more effective system for designing ethics rules for the legal
profession.51
II. REASONING DEFICIENCIES IN ETHICS RULEMAKING
Part I described processes for developing rules of legal ethics that in many
ways seem to be throwbacks to an earlier era of self-regulatory guilds52:
Lawyers who are members of state or national bar associations draft and pass
rules for their regulation and contribute substantially to existing rules’
interpretation through separately generated ethics opinions. Of course, the
process in the legal ethics context differs from true self-regulation in that
mechanisms for the enforcement of ethics rules are generally in government
hands, and the rules and opinions drafted and issued by bar associations
generally only have binding effect to the extent they are embraced by
government actors such as state supreme courts.53 The fact that lawyer
regulation is, in fact, commonly implemented by government actors can,
however, only make the general bar-mediated approach to lawyer regulation
seem more antiquated.54
51. See John S. Dzienkowski, The Regulation of the American Legal Profession and Its
Reform, 68 TEX. L. REV. 451, 454 (1989) (book review) (suggesting that the legal profession
could use lessons from a regulated industries perspective in drafting its rules).
52. See John C. Coffee Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1316 (2003) (“The blunt truth is that private self-regulation of attorneys
through bar associations means the continued government of the guild, by the guild, and for
the guild.”).
53. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147, 1147
(2009) (observing that attorneys “are governed by professional rules, usually adopted and
enforced by state supreme courts”); id. at 1153 (observing that “the power to discipline layers
has shifted from bar organizations to state judiciaries”); see also Schneyer, supra note 8, at 38
(noting the common sequence in which “the ABA writes ethics codes and state supreme courts
give them legal effect, perhaps amending them in the process”).
54. A parallel situation recently arose in the regulation of tax practitioners by the U.S.
Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and its Office of
Professional Responsibility. Treasury and the IRS have exercised their inherent powers to
regulate lawyers, accountants, enrolled agents, and tax return preparers through regulations
and rulemakings. 31 U.S.C. § 330; 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.0–10.97 (2020); The Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR) At-a-Glance, IRS (July 23, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/taxprofessionals/the-office-of-professional-responsibility-opr-at-a-glance
[https://perma.cc/
67NL-LNDF]. Though the executive branch and its captive agency have argued that they
have an inherent right to regulate those who practice before it, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit held that Congress had not authorized Treasury and the IRS to regulate tax
preparers. See Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding a “tax preparer”
was not a tax “representative” under 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)). These developments are one
aspect of a more general application of the Administrative Procedure Act and administrative
law to tax rulemaking, despite claims of tax exceptionalism. See generally Kristen E.
Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with
Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727
(2007); Kristen E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465 (2013).
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Even though state supreme courts typically preside over their states’
systems for lawyer regulation, these systems often seem to be relics from a
pre–Administrative Procedure Act55 (APA) world, more resonant of the
cooperative industrial codes of the long defunct National Industrial Recovery
Act56 (NIRA) than the systems of court-supervised reasoned decisionmaking by administrative agencies that have become characteristic of
modern regulatory regimes.57 The NIRA’s allowance of “self-regulatory”
codes of “fair competition” approved by the president after drafting by
industry players perhaps all too predictably led to price-fixing and other
anticompetitive behavior that served the interests of industry incumbents but
often worked against the interests of the public at large.58 Likewise, perhaps
all too predictably, the reliance on outdated approaches to judicial
supervision of the cooperative “self-regulation” of lawyers perpetuates rules
based on professional protectionism and anticompetition, as well as outdated
rules that simply do not comport with modern practice.59 Even when judges
consider adopting new guidance for modern problems in the practice of law,
such as the use of advances in technology in lawyer advertising, the failure
to demand a process of reasoned decision-making like that generally required
under standard administrative law leads to inadequate or suboptimal
regulation.

55. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706.
56. Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), invalidated by A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); see Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust,
82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 664–65 (2004) (describing competitor cooperation under the NIRA and
public disenchantment “as consumers realized the effects of allowing firms to cooperate
through codes”); Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative
State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 32 (1994)
(describing a provision of the NIRA that “allowed the President to approve ‘codes of fair
competition’—essentially cartel agreements promulgated by industry groups and then
enforced by the government” (quoting Schechter, 295 U.S. at 521–22)).
57. See David S. Tatel, The Administrative Process and the Rule of Environmental Law,
34 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (describing “the two primary elements of judicial review”
under the APA framework as “ensuring that agency action is authorized by law and is neither
arbitrary nor capricious”); Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st
Century Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 944 (2000) (“The
Administrative Procedure Act’s safeguards promote agency accountability and reasoned
decision-making by providing a more regular and effective role for both the public and the
judiciary.”).
58. See Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain, 73 ANTITRUST L.J.
483, 500 (2006) (“In implementation . . . the [National Recovery Administration] Codes of
Fair Competition were rapidly captured by multiple concentrated industry groups, industry by
industry, under cover of the self-regulatory ideology promoted by big-business interests.”);
John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713,
718 n.17 (1986) (“Roosevelt’s great New Deal initiative, the National Industrial Recovery Act
of 1933 (NIRA), sanctioned codes of ‘fair competition’ throughout the economy that were in
practice often highly anticompetitive.”); Note, Cooperative Buying of Gasoline as Sherman
Act Violation, 49 YALE L.J. 761, 766 (1940) (“‘Cooperation’ as a mask for self-interest
attained full bloom with the advent of the [National Recovery Administration].”).
59. Judges can possess the most altruistic motives in their work on codes of conduct, but
many rules are based on norms that were developed decades ago in a different practice setting
and continue to apply to lawyer conduct half a century later.
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Even with state actors tending to handle the major mechanisms of case-bycase rule enforcement,60 lawyers play an outsize role in developing and
interpreting the rules that govern their profession.61 The ABA develops and
issues the Model Rules of Professional Conduct through a quasi-legislative
process, in which the ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility (CEPR) “recommend[s] Model Rules changes to the ABA
‘legislature,’ the House of Delegates.”62 The CEPR even more regularly
issues advisory opinions that interpret the Model Rules.63 State bar
associations do similar work in drafting rules and instructive opinions
interpreting rules.64 The work of the various professional associations on
these fronts has a very substantial influence on the regulatory regimes
officially developed and implemented by state courts, whether by providing
rules, or interpretations thereof, that the courts adopt65 or, even without
authoritative adoption by the courts, by effectively determining how lawyers,
in their day-to-day work, understand and seek to comply with applicable
rules.66

60. Cf. Schneyer, supra note 8, at 35 (noting that “a bewildering array of institutions now
have often-overlapping claims to regulatory authority in [the legal] field”).
61. Zacharias, supra note 53, at 1150 (“[B]ecause lawyers participate heavily in producing
the governing professional rules and the broader external law that affects the bar, lawyers in
some respects are distinct among regulated professionals.”).
62. Schneyer, supra note 8, at 39.
63. See id. (“CEPR’s main task is to interpret the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in
advisory ethics opinions.”); see also Lawrence K. Hellman, When “Ethics Rules” Don’t Mean
What They Say: The Implications of Strained ABA Ethics Opinions, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
317, 317 (1996) (“The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
regularly issues formal opinions which expound upon the ‘proper’ interpretation and
application of the ABA models upon which the states’ rules are based.”).
64. Peter A. Joy, Making Ethics Opinions Meaningful: Toward More Effective Regulation
of Lawyers’ Conduct, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 313, 317 (2002) (“Academics have . . .
underestimated the importance of state and local ethics opinions to practicing lawyers and
judges.”).
65. See Lynn A. Baker, The Politics of Legal Ethics: Case Study of a Rule Change, 53
ARIZ. L. REV. 425, 425 (2011) (“The state supreme courts . . . have typically delegated the
bulk of the actual regulatory work to their state bar associations and, ultimately, to certain
state bar committees.”); Edward C. Brewer III, Some Thoughts on the Process of Making
Ethics Rules, Including How to Make the “Appearance of Impropriety” Disappear, 39 IDAHO
L. REV. 321, 321 (2003) (describing “two initial stages [in the development of ethics rules]:
the American Bar Association’s and other organizations’ creation of model provisions, and
the states’ or courts’ promulgation of codes or rules having the effect of law”); Ted Finman &
Theodore Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions in Regulating Lawyer
Conduct: A Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, 29 UCLA L. REV. 67, 71 (1981) (observing that ABA ethics opinions “are
frequently cited by courts and other Code enforcement tribunals, by state and local ethics
committees, and in treatises and law school casebooks”); Green, supra note 8, at 463 (“[I]n
judicial proceedings within a particular state, lawyers’ conduct is typically governed by a set
of rules adopted by that state’s judiciary based on a version of either the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (‘ABA Model Rules’) or the predecessor ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility (‘ABA Model Code’).”).
66. See Joy, supra note 64, at 313 (observing that, with respect to “many everyday ethical
questions,” “a prudent lawyer . . . must look to the ethics opinions in her jurisdiction for
guidance”).
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To illustrate the crucial role that state bar associations can play in the
development of legal ethics rules, one can consult Professor Lynn Baker’s
account of the process for and results of amendments to a Texas ethics rule
in 2005.67 The rule in question concerned lawyer fee sharing, and the rule
amendments, fortified by a slew of new “formal comments,” substantially
limited the scope of authorized fee-sharing arrangements and imposed more
burdensome requirements of disclosure and client consent.68 The changes
not only dramatically altered the substance of Texas rules with respect to feesharing arrangements69 but also evidently reflected a fundamental rejection
of the pre-2005 rule’s general philosophy “that client disclosure and consent
were needed only in situations in which the splitting of fees would ‘result in
a further disclosure of client confidences and have a financial impact on a
client.’”70
How did these rules and associated comments come to be adopted by the
Supreme Court of Texas? In 2003, the Supreme Court proposed a new rule
capping referral fees and then, in response to an overwhelmingly negative
response to the proposed rule, backpedaled, withdrawing the proposal and
calling for a state bar task force to look into new rules to regulate referral
fees.71 By the end of June 2004, a task force issued a report with
recommendations, and the State Bar of Texas Board of Directors
unanimously agreed to the task force’s proposed amendments.72 The
Supreme Court oversaw a two-month public comment period on the
proposed changes and then ordered a state bar referendum on the proposals,
in which about 40 percent of state bar members voted by a 54 percent to 45
percent margin in favor of the changes.73 In January 2005, the Supreme
Court issued an order making the rules effective on March 1, 2005.74 The
entirety of the Supreme Court’s reasoning was as follows:
The Court has considered the petition of the State Bar of Texas
requesting an order promulgating the amendments to the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, and, based on the results of the
Referendum held November 5, 2004, to December 20, 2004, as certified by
the Executive Director of the State Bar of Texas and the Clerk of the
Supreme Court of Texas, the Court finds that all issues submitted to the
lawyers of Texas in this referendum were approved by a majority vote.75

One might hope that the task force’s report proposing these changes would
have included reasoning adequate to support them. But this would start as a
67. See generally Baker, supra note 65.
68. See id. at 426–30.
69. Cf. id. at 426 (“From January 1, 1990 until March 1, 2005, the Texas ethics rule
governing fee sharing between lawyers was one of the least restrictive in the country.”).
70. Id. at 431 (quoting TEX. DISCIPLINARY PRO. CONDUCT R. 1.04 cmt.10 (1989) (amended
2005)).
71. See id. at 432.
72. See id. at 433.
73. See id. at 433–34.
74. Order Promulgating Amendments to Rule 1.04 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct (Tex. Jan. 28, 2005).
75. Id. at 1.
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relatively slim hope, given that the report preceded any public comments on
the proposals. Further, Baker has detailed how the report: (1) failed
anywhere to “discuss what policy concerns do or should underlie client
disclosure and consent requirements in the context of fee sharing,”76 (2) did
not more particularly say “why the Task Force thought it necessary to
mandate a more burdensome form of disclosure and consent,”77 and (3)
“provide[d] no information regarding . . . why the benefits of the changes
were expected to exceed the costs.”78 Moreover, the task force’s report
generally endorsed the view that Texas’s rules on referral fees should “be in
the mainstream, because Texas practitioners will then have some guidance in
interpreting any new referral fee rule from other jurisdictions, commentators,
the [American Law Institute]’s Restatement, and the ABA’s relevant Model
Rules.”79 But in some tension with this,80 the task force elsewhere
acknowledged that “[t]he disclosures required under [the proposed
amendments] exceed those mandated by the ABA.”81 Baker separately
emphasized that in fact
[n]o other state’s rules, nor the ABA Model Rules: (1) explicitly require
that client consent [to fee sharing] be obtained prior to the time of the
association or referral proposed; (2) explicitly preclude waiver by clients
of their right to disclosure and consent prior to the time their signing
attorney enters into a fee-sharing arrangement at that attorney’s own
expense; or (3) impose such potentially draconian financial penalties on
attorneys who do not comply with the rule’s disclosure and consent
requirements.82

In light of identified deficiencies in the reasoning behind the rule and
comment changes, Baker recommended a variety of reforms. For example,
she called for requiring better explanation of the aims of such changes83 and
an analysis of the costs and benefits expected to result.84 Baker even more
specifically recommended that whatever committee or task force drafted the
changes “undertake an independent investigation of the problem it is charged
to remedy,” with this investigation to include
(a) the systematic gathering of views of the members of each sector of the
profession represented on the committee regarding any proposed rule
changes; (b) an analysis by each committee member of the expected costs
and benefits of each proposed rule change to the clients serviced by the
76.
77.
78.
79.

Baker, supra note 65, at 435.
Id. at 436.
Id. at 438.
STATE BAR OF TEX. REFERRAL FEE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 25 (2004).
80. See Baker, supra note 65, at 439 (explaining the rationale for Texas to be in the
mainstream).
81. STATE BAR OF TEX. REFERRAL FEE TASK FORCE, supra note 79, at 3.
82. Baker, supra note 65, at 438.
83. Id. at 447 (“Any proposed change to a state’s ethics rules should include . . . a
statement of the existing problem sought to be remedied.”).
84. Id. (“Any proposed change to a state’s ethics rules should include . . . an analysis of
why the benefits are predicted to exceed the costs.”); see also id. at 450.
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sector of the legal profession that the committee member represents; and
(c) a comprehensive survey of what rule(s) and formal comments, if any,
every other state and the ABA have adopted to address the problem at
issue.85

Aware of concerns that this committee or task force might itself not be
properly representative of affected sectors of the profession, Baker
additionally suggested that the criteria for selecting these members “be
clearly and publicly articulated” and that, “[w]hatever goal of representation
is chosen, the sector of the profession that each member represents . . . be
identified, as well as the proportion of the profession included in that sector.86
This example illustrates the court’s deference to a bar committee process
that resulted in a change to the Texas practice on referral fees and to
implementation of a more onerous disclosure standard than is required in
other jurisdictions. No one disputes the authority of the court to adopt this
rule, but the process led to a rule that could easily subject a lawyer to
discipline or loss of a fee without explaining the reasoning underlying the
rule’s unusually burdensome demands. This is just one example, but it
highlights the commonly undisciplined nature of ethics code rulemaking.
Another example of judicial rulemaking involves the Washington State
Supreme Court’s decision to rescind the state’s Limited License Legal
Technician (LLLT) program. In 2012, the state of Washington led the
country in developing a licensure system for nonlawyers to provide legal
services in specific areas of practice.87 This was viewed as expanding access
to legal services for individuals of limited means who might need help in
areas as fundamental as family law.88 The pilot program was to provide a
trial of whether nonlawyers could competently deliver basic services to the
public under the supervision of the courts.
In 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, changes in the composition of
the Washington State Supreme Court led to a vote to sunset the LLLT
program with little notice and with no formal study of the experiment.89 At
the time of the court’s decision, LLLT regulators had proposed expanding
the program to other areas of the law.90 Nonetheless, without notice and
reasoning, the court ended the experiment without assessing its value to the
general public, lawyers in the areas served by LLLTs, or the individuals who
had begun the process of becoming licensed to practice under the program.91
This action led supporters of the LLLT program to proclaim that the court
85. Id.
86. Id. at 448.
87. See Stephen R. Crossland & Paula C. Littlewood, The Washington State Limited
License Legal Technician Program: Enhancing Access to Justice and Ensuring the Integrity
of the Legal Profession, 65 S.C. L. REV. 611, 611–12 (2014).
88. Id. at 612–13.
89. Lyle Moran, How the Washington Supreme Court’s LLLT Program Met Its Demise,
ABA J. (July 9, 2020), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/how-washingtons-limitedlicense-legal-technician-program-met-its-demise [https://perma.cc/LRM4-JGCR].
90. Id.
91. Id.
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had engaged in anticompetitive behavior supporting lawyer protectionism
without regard to benefit to the public.92
The Texas and Washington State examples demonstrate cause for concerns
about the quality of reasoning and representation—of logic and fairness—in
ethics rulemaking. Moreover, these concerns resonate with similar concerns
about bar associations’ separate processes for generating ethics opinions.93
Such opinions are guidance documents that characteristically provide barassociation-sanctioned interpretations of ethics rules in specific hypothetical
contexts.94 In theory, such opinions interpret the ethics codes, but in more
recent times, opinion-writing committees have addressed issues that the
codes do not cover. Thus, in a sense, these committees are filling a void in
guidance in many new areas because of the difficulty that the courts
experience in promulgating new rules.95 Multiple commentators have
criticized some of these opinions as poorly—arguably, not even plausibly—
reasoned, thereby echoing Baker’s concerns with the quality of reasoning in
processes for adopting binding ethics rules.96
Of course, opinions only become generally applicable law to the extent
that they are adopted through a binding rulemaking process or by courts in
precedent-setting adjudication. Although professional associations’ opinions
are influential, it is not rare for their interpretations to be rejected by state
courts or other authorities.97 Thus, one might hope, for example, that any
92. Id.
93. Two examples of ethics opinions issued in Texas illustrate the problems. In 2014, the
Professional Ethics Committee of the State Bar of Texas issued Ethics Opinion 642, which
prohibited law firms from giving a nonlawyer the title of chief technology officer. The opinion
was revised one year later to reverse this position. See State Bar of Tex. Pro. Ethics Comm.,
Ethics Op. 642 (2015) (revised). In 2014, the committee issued an opinion that applied
conflicts law and full imputation to law students who worked in legal positions during the
summer. See State Bar of Tex. Pro. Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 644 (2014). The Texas Supreme
Court amended comments to the ethics rules to reverse this decision, which created serious
issues for law students obtaining employment. See Order Amending Comments to the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure,
supra note 29.
94. See Hellman, supra note 63, at 324–25 (describing CEPR ethics opinions as
“interpretations of the Model Rules and Model Code [set forth] by applying their provisions
to concrete factual situations posed as hypothetical problems”).
95. In general, an ethics opinion committee is intended to offer guidance on how adopted
rules apply to certain fact patterns. These committees have typically not been created to offer
advice on topics completely outside of the adopted rules. The composition of many ethics
committees does not provide the committee with expertise in all legal areas. Moreover, the
committees commonly do not have research staff or experience in drafting ethics codes. Given
such limitations, it is not surprising to see the committees issue opinions that are incomplete
or that fail to take account of important aspects of various areas of practice.
96. See Hellman, supra note 63, at 317 (“[B]esides fomenting uncertainty regarding
specific issues, the cavalier approach to interpretation employed over time by the ABA Ethics
Committee threatens to undercut the Bar’s respect for the legitimacy of the ‘ethics rules’ as
binding constraints on the practice of law.”); Schneyer, supra note 8, at 39 (“According to
commentators, some CEPR opinions lack any tenable rationale under the ethics rules they
claim to interpret.”).
97. See Hellman, supra note 63, at 329 (“In fact, it is not at all unusual for state authorities
to adopt interpretations that conflict with ABA Ethics opinions addressing the very same
language.”).
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defects in professional associations’ opinion-making processes are remedied
by careful, independent consideration of relevant interpretive questions in the
courts. But here commentators have raised concern that appropriately careful
and thorough consideration is too frequently lacking—and indeed perhaps
not generally to be expected in case-by-case adjudication by generalist judges
seeking to interpret rules that govern a wide variety of lawyer conduct.98
Although the ABA has been instrumental in drafting codes and in
advocating for judicial and bar association regulation of the practice of law,
it has not provided formal guidance for states to adopt processes for
considering, drafting, and adopting ethics rules or for state opinion-writing
processes. The ABA has primarily focused on advocating for state adoption
of its ethics codes without modification, a goal that the states’ development
of independent best practices for consideration of ethics rules and their
interpretation might undermine. Without central coordination on processes
for the promulgation or interpretation of rules, the states have adopted a wide
diversity of approaches.99 Moreover, in many states, processes for
rulemaking are substantially opaque and inaccessible for many important
stakeholders until a final, formally noticed process for review of new rules
by the high court, a stage that comes after much of the most significant work
has been done.
Nonetheless, a number of states have adopted reforms that, despite the
bar’s continued role in self-regulation, buck historical exclusion of
nonlawyers from the provision of legal services and make relevant
rulemaking processes more transparent and inclusive.100 As discussed
above,101 the Washington State Supreme Court permitted nonlawyers to
deliver routine legal services in certain basic areas of law to improve access
to justice through its LLLT program.102 Similarly, in 2019, the Utah
Supreme Court created an Office of Legal Services Innovation to oversee a
regulatory sandbox in which nonlawyer participants can apply to offer legal

98. See Brewer, supra note 65, at 338 (describing rulemaking’s advantages, relative to
adjudication, in enabling “careful scrutiny by all concerned, . . . identification of better
alternatives,” and buy-in by broader legal and client communities); Green, supra note 8, at
467–68 (“[B]ecause judicial decision-making in adjudication lacks the openness and
deliberateness that is characteristic of rulemaking, rulings concerning lawyer conduct are
unlikely to be fully considered and, consequently, unlikely to command respect within the
legal profession.”); id. at 491 (“In adjudication, courts tend to overlook relevant considerations
and to provide unsatisfactory explanations for the choices they make, thereby undermining
confidence that they have adopted the most appropriate standards of professional conduct.”).
99. See Emily S. Taylor Poppe, Evidence-Based Promulgation: Reconsidering the
Rulemaking Process for Disciplinary Rules, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1275, 1290 app. (2021).
100. See, e.g., Brooks Holland, The Washington State Limited License Legal Technician
Practice Rule: A National First in Access to Justice, 82 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 75, 90 (2013) (noting
that, although Washington State’s groundbreaking LLLT rule “originated within the
[Washington State Bar Association], . . . a substantial portion of the [Washington bar] strongly
and publicly opposed the LLLT Rule, including the [bar’s] Board of Governors”).
101. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
102. See Holland, supra note 100, at 77 (describing the Washington State Supreme Court’s
adoption of the LLLT rule in 2012).
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services to the public in a pilot program.103 A few other states are also
considering experimentation in nonlawyer involvement in legal services, and
such proposals are following a model of transparency and stakeholder
input.104
Individual high courts and state bars have also adopted best practices for
consideration of ethics rules. Arizona maintains a portal for rulemaking and
lawyer regulation and invites comments and proposals about court rules.105
Colorado’s state bar rules committee features participation by a variety of
stakeholders, including judges, and documents its process and decisionmaking in detail.106 Many state ethics opinion-writing committees have
implemented notice-and-comment processes and have apparently sought to
incorporate diverse viewpoints through committee membership.107 Each of
these advances offers promise, but best practices have not yet been adopted
in a majority of states.108
In sum, there is a general concern that, in developing proposed rules or
rule interpretations, bar associations, the courts, or other government actors
who consume the associations’ work too often fail to exhibit a process of
reasoned decision-making that provides confidence that ethics rules, as
adopted and understood, are well suited to their ends. Such concern with
promoting appropriately reasoned decision-making by unelected actors is a
primary focus of administrative law. Thus, Part III describes how modern
administrative law shows a path for courts to insist on filling the reasoned
decision-making deficit that is all too common in ethics rulemakings.

103. Lyle Moran, Utah Embraces Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms as Part of Its Broad
Access-to-Justice Reforms, ABA J. (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.abajournal.com/web/
article/utah-embraces-nonlawyer-ownership-of-law-firms-as-part-of-broad-reforms
[https://perma.cc/DW7X-62BX].
104. See, e.g., Admin. Order No. 2020-173 (Ariz. Nov. 4, 2020) (providing for Arizona’s
alternative business structure certification).
105. See Rules Review Committee, STATE BAR OF ARIZ., https://www.azbar.org/aboutus/board-of-governors/board-committees/rules-review-committee [https://perma.cc/NE4VHPWT] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
106. See Rules of Professional Conduct Standing Committee, COLO. JUD. BRANCH,
https://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Supreme_Court/Committees/Committee.cfm?Committ
ee_ID=24&showHistory=false [https://perma.cc/K62U-TXCZ] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021)
(“The Committee is comprised of members of varying backgrounds, including trial-level
judges, appellate judges, law school professors, disciplinary prosecutors, and attorneys in
private practice in a broad range of practice areas.”).
107. In 2020, the Professional Ethics Committee of the State Bar of Texas implemented a
notice-and-comment process for opinions under consideration. See Pro. Ethics Comm., Public
Comment: Docketed Requests, STATE BAR OF TEX., https://www.texasbar.com/AM/
Template.cfm?Section=pec&Template=/pec/vendor/comment.cfm [https://perma.cc/4A9WMJXE] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (detailing the online process for notice and comment).
108. A compendium of best practices of the rulemaking and opinion-writing processes
would be beneficial for consideration by the high courts of the states and state bars.
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III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW’S REASONED DECISION-MAKING REQUIREMENT
AS A SALVE FOR LEGAL ETHICS REGULATION
In the context of the rulemaking and opinion-writing work of
administrative agencies, courts have long enforced requirements of fair play
and reasoned decision-making. For an agency’s issuance of binding
substantive rules, this enforcement has generally involved (1) policing basic
requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking109 and (2) demanding
contemporaneous and appropriate justification by the agency of the new
rules.110 For the provision of nonbinding guidance in the nature of
professional associations’ ethics opinions, specific procedural demands may
be very limited.111 Nonetheless, the courts can prod agencies toward better
procedure by making the weight that the court gives to agency guidance
depend not only on the quality of an agency’s reasoning but also on the
procedure that the agency employed in developing that reasoning, including
the thoroughness of the agency’s decision-making process.112
Likewise, state courts can have difficulty directly attacking problems with
ethics rulemaking at its roots. The role of the ABA in promulgating ethics
rules that serve as the baseline for federal and state consideration of ethics
rules complicates reform of the process because specific state courts
generally lack direct control or jurisdiction over ABA processes. Thus, the
focus of any reform must be state and federal processes for adopting ethics
rules and interpreting them over time.
This part contends that the courts’ enforcement of reasoned decisionmaking requirements through “hard looks” at agencies’ work113 provides a
model for how the courts can better police the fairness and quality of ethics
rulemaking. Ethics rules have significance for clients and the broader public,
as well as the bar. Thus, courts should not blithely give their approval to new
ethics rules that win the support of a majority of bar members who participate
in a referendum. Nor should courts give professional associations’ ethics
109. See infra Part III.A; see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c).
110. See infra Part III.A; see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)
(proclaiming the “simple but fundamental rule of administrative law” that courts are to review
an agency decision based on the “grounds invoked by the agency” at the time of the decision).
111. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (exempting “interpretive rules” and “general statements of
policy” from general notice-and-comment requirements). Even though ethics opinions are not
considered binding, state courts have often taken the effort to withdraw or overrule opinions
that are considered incorrectly decided, a practice presumably reflecting the fact that lawyers
find it difficult to disregard such ethics opinions, as they often are the only guidance in a
particular area.
112. Cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (“The fair measure of
deference to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with
circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency,
formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”
(footnotes and citation omitted)).
113. See HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL COURTS STANDARDS OF
REVIEW: APPELLATE COURT REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS AND AGENCY ACTIONS
168 (2007) (discussing courts’ capacity to take “a ‘hard look’ at agency actions emanating
from informal rulemaking proceedings and other agency actions based on less than full trialtype records”).
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opinions more weight than the procedures and reasoning evident in their
production merit. By tying the weight of such opinions to indicators of
quality, courts can encourage professional associations to follow best
practices without rigidly demanding high-cost investments in efforts to
provide plausible, even if imperfect, guidance to bar associations’
members.114
The contention here is not that judicial “hard look” review of ethics rules
and opinions is a panacea. No one would contend that such review is perfect
and unproblematic even in administrative law contexts where it has long been
deployed. The point is that hard-look review for reasoned decision-making
is something that courts already do regularly and that such review seems well
designed to help with many of the defects in current ethics rulemaking
highlighted in Parts II and III.
A. Judicial Policing of Procedure and Substance in Rulemaking
Consider the courts’ treatment of the generation of binding substantive
rules. When administrative agencies issue such rules, both federal and state
courts commonly enforce requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking
that are meant to give interested constituencies—regulated parties, public
interest groups, concerned citizens, other government bodies, and
politicians—a meaningful opportunity to respond to a proposal for new rules,
including by suggesting alternatives. Even without insisting that all
constituency groups have seats at the drafting table—which we will assume,
for purposes here, to have seats populated by members of the bar—their
capacity to make comments on proposed rules can have a significant role in
shaping the rules, the provision of justifications for them, or the rules’ later
invalidation. In the agency context, courts have policed the meaningfulness
of notice-and-comment rulemaking not only through enforcing bar
requirements that members of the public have an opportunity to comment on
a proposal for rulemaking but also by demanding that any agency’s notice of
proposed rulemaking place the public fairly on notice of the potential content
of the rules under consideration.115 Courts also require that an agency
respond satisfactorily to relevant comments, either by tailoring ultimately
issued rules accordingly or by providing a reasonable explanation by the time
of rule issuance of why, for example, the agency found a critique to be
unconvincing.116
114. To the extent courts fail to follow the recommendations set forth in such guidance in
situations where attorneys might have reasonably relied on it, courts can mitigate the effects
for potentially surprised members of the bar by limiting the consequences for past violations
of a previously unclear rule.
115. See Richard J. Pierce Jr., Waiting for Vermont Yankee III, IV, and V?: A Response to
Beermann and Lawson, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 902, 903 (2007) (noting “the two requirements
that a final rule must be a logical outgrowth of the rulemaking process, and that an agency
must disclose, in its notice of proposed rulemaking, any studies or other data sources on which
the agency proposes to rely when it issues its final rule”).
116. See id. at 907 (noting how hard look review can result in reversal of agency action
“because [the agency] did not adequately consider one or more of the scores of decisional
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These demands for a meaningful opportunity to comment and for
contemporary responsiveness to comments can help substitute for
assembling all relevant interest groups at the drafting table ex ante. Indeed,
in combination with the requirement of fair notice, these requirements can
help ensure that relevant interest groups are in fact canvassed, even in
advance of a rulemaking proposal, to help avoid undue surprise in reaction
to the ultimate form that a rule takes after any rejiggering in light of
comments.117 Moreover, such interactions and those that occur during the
later comment period itself can effectively substitute for the actual provision
of a seat at the drafting table by leading the formal drafters to shape or
reshape the relevant rules in ways suggested by interested persons’ feedback.
This provision for a substantial and enforceable channel by which outside
parties can influence the rulemaking process can help answer the criticism
that having bar associations draft ethics rules “is a classic case of ‘the fox
guarding the henhouse,’ and thus unacceptable.”118 Although the answer is
no doubt imperfect, judicial insistence on such reasoned responsiveness can
help ensure that advantages of expertise and efficiency gained from using a
professional association as a formal rule drafter do not entirely swamp
concerns about the association members’ potential biases. To the extent such
concerns remain substantial, courts may properly insist on adequate
representation of distinct, relevant sectors of the bar in the drafting process
and, as Baker has suggested, should insist at a minimum on transparency
regarding the interests and expertise of those with seats at the drafting
table.119
Of course, the requirement that the rulemaker respond contemporaneously,
either through tailoring of a draft rule or through explanation of the failure to
tailor, is crucial to helping ensure that this virtuous cycle of seeking input
factors, critiques contained in comments, data gaps or inconsistencies, or plausible alternatives
to its proposed rule”).
117. Federal administrative law provides a formal statutory route for such canvassing—
indeed for seeking consensus among diverse interests on a draft rule—through its provisions
for so-called “negotiated rulemaking,” a process in which an agency “form[s] a stakeholder
committee . . . and then employ[s] the stakeholders’ consensus-based rule (if a consensus is
formed) as the proposed rule on which the public comments.” Hannah J. Wiseman, Negotiated
Rulemaking and New Risks: A Rail Safety Case Study, 7 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 207, 219
(2017); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570a (setting forth “a framework for the conduct of
negotiated rulemaking”). Negotiated rulemaking has not escaped controversy. See William
Funk, The Future of Progressive Regulatory Reform—a Review and Critique of Two
Proposals, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707, 723–24 (2019) (“Ever since the Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS) adopted a recommendation favoring the use of
negotiated rulemaking in certain circumstances, there has been a lively literature extolling the
benefits of such rulemaking or doubting its benefits.”). Nonetheless, experience with
negotiated rulemaking’s pluses and minuses might productively inform how a rule drafting
process for legal ethics could seek to actively involve people beyond bar association members
in early stages of discussion and drafting.
118. Schneyer, supra note 8, at 41.
119. Cf. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“Under our system of
government, the very legitimacy of general policymaking performed by unelected
administrators depends in no small part upon the openness, accessibility, and amenability of
these officials to the needs and ideas of the public . . . .”).
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and properly responding to it in fact occurs. Hence, it makes sense for courts
to demand that such responses indeed occur contemporaneously: courts
generally demand that agency action be justified based on the agency record
at the time of the rule’s issuance, rather than through post hoc reasoning or
evidence.120
In the ethics context, a demand for a professional association rulemaker to
engage in a notice-and-comment process and then to respond satisfactorily
and contemporaneously to comments might substitute for a more specific
demand for cost-benefit analysis along the lines of that advised by Baker. In
some contexts, cost-benefit analysis might not be a particularly promising or
enlightening way to assess the advisability of a new rule. In contexts where
cost-benefit analysis is feasible, relevant, and enlightening, commentators
who have concerns about a proposed rule might be expected to suggest that
it fails such analysis. The rulemaker’s duty to respond satisfactorily can then
provide a context-dependent trigger for it to engage in such analysis
responsively, rather than requiring that the rulemaker engage in cost-benefit
analysis in all contexts and in the first instance, even when unpromising.
A further check on the quality of ethics rulemaking would come through
courts’ engagement in hard look review of final rules for reasoned
justification in the rulemaking record. Particularly where a court or
professional association has flagged the purposes of a proposed rule in
advance, the prospect of such review should act as a force, independent of a
need to respond to comments, that encourages the rulemaker to affirmatively
develop a record of quality evidence and reasoning in support of ultimately
issued rules. In reviewing agency rules to check that they are not arbitrary
or capricious, state—as well as federal—courts commonly give the rules a
“hard”—even though deferential—look, checking “that the agency
considered all the factors relevant to the objectives of the agency’s delegated
rulemaking authority, and engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.”121
Furthermore, courts are to consider an agency to have acted arbitrarily if it:
“(1) omits from its consideration a factor that the Legislature intended the
agency to consider in the circumstances; (2) includes in its consideration an
irrelevant factor; or (3) reaches a completely unreasonable result after
weighing only relevant factors.”122 A failure to explain the rejection of
plausible alternatives that were contemplated at the time can provide grounds
for a conclusion that the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously.123
Such hard look review for reasoned decision-making can thus help ensure
a baseline level of quality in the contemporaneous evidence and reasoning
for a rulemaking result, even aside from particular feedback received through
a notice-and-comment procedure. It can even help encourage a professional

120. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983) (holding that “courts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc
rationalizations for agency action”).
121. Reliant Energy, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 62 S.W.3d 833, 841 (Tex. App. 2001).
122. Id.
123. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46.
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committee to use the notice-and-comment procedure to help flush out
potential criticisms and gather further supporting evidence and argument,
thereby rendering a bar association’s ultimate rule proposal more robust
against a later hard look by a state supreme court. In the ethics rulemaking
context, such review could also provide a further, circumstance-specific
means of effectively requiring cost-benefit analysis by a rule drafter where it
is apt—for example, because the charge to the rule drafter by a state’s
supreme court or relevant professional association itself demanded explicitly
or implicitly, through emphasis on the economic sensibility of any rule
adopted, that such an analysis be done.
One objection to this hard look proposal for new legal ethics rules could
be that when large rules packages are at issue, the demands on the judiciary
for ex ante hard look review of all proposed rules before their adoption may
be too demanding. Of course, this concern about the resource limitations of
the judiciary—in particular, state supreme courts—brings back to mind Part
I’s suggestion that more radical reform to processes of ethics rulemaking may
be desirable.124 In the meantime, however, one possibility for state
judiciaries in such situations could be to permit challenges to new rules for
some reasonable time after what might be viewed as their provisional
adoption. The courts could then rule on the validity of specific ethics
provisions challenged by parties before them in what amount to discrete
actions, returning judicial officers to a zone of greater comfort in which they
rule on questions of process and, with appropriate deference, on matters of
substance, in response to disputes brought before them by outside parties.
B. Giving Weight to Opinions in Accordance with Evidence of Quality
In relation to ethics opinions as opposed to proposed rules, the question is
the extent to which those opinions should have influence on a court’s later
decision in an individual case. Here, the courts can give weight to these
opinions in a way that at least encourages professional associations to use
best practices in producing and justifying them. The U.S. Supreme Court’s
discussion of the weight to give an agency’s interpretation of a statute in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.125 provides a model for how a court can calibrate
the weight, or degree of deference, that it gives to such an opinion in a way
that effectively rewards indicia of opinion quality. In Skidmore, the Court
explained that, when an agency interpreted a statute for which it had special
responsibility, the Court would treat the agency’s opinion as “constitut[ing]
a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants
may properly resort for guidance.”126 But the Court emphasized that “[t]he
weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its

124. See supra Part I.
125. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
126. Id. at 141.

1148

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade.”127
Skidmore’s multifactor analysis and sliding scale of deference have drawn
fire in administrative law for failing to provide enough advance clarity about
the weight to be accorded agency interpretations. But such an approach
seems, if anything, more appropriate and defensible for a situation in which
a court might be the first government actor to make a definitive judgment on
the meaning of a particular ethics rule and the weight to be accorded a private
professional association’s opinion—or, perhaps even more specifically, the
opinion of a committee of a private professional association—about the
rule’s proper interpretation. In the ethics context, there seems no basis for
substantial doubt that a court needs to make its own judgment about the rule’s
meaning. But as with expert testimony that might be presented to a court on
other issues, a professional association’s ethics opinion may provide useful
guidance and, to the extent it reflects reasoned and well-informed
deliberation, may well merit substantial weight. Moreover, as indicated
above, by making clear that the weight accorded such an opinion depends on
the quality of the process and reasoning that generated it, a court can help
promote the production of well-reasoned ethics opinions in the future.
CONCLUSION
The basics of the modern system for the regulation of American lawyers
have been in place for over a century—this system is fundamentally
decentralized, relying on the separate work of high courts of the states and
their local bar associations. Historically, it seemed natural to vest in high
court judges the power to regulate the practice of law. However, the rapidly
changing nature of lawyering has placed much stress on the system of
decentralized self-regulation that has resulted. This system of bar-mediated
rulemaking has failed to produce ethics rules that properly address the
complexities of modern law practice. In combination with procedural
failings of the processes for developing and interpreting ethics rules, these
substantive failings cause various aspects of present-day ethics rules to
appear either arbitrary or capricious, or at the very least, ill-suited to
promoting the sort of healthy legal profession that society needs.
Administrative law points to ways to address this problem by providing
guidance on how courts can promote reasoned decision-making in ethics
rulemaking and opinion issuing. Courts have long deployed approaches to
enforcing requirements of reasoned decision-making on administrative
agencies. They should adapt these techniques and experience to help police
the quality of regulation meant to demand and encourage ethical behavior by
lawyers, while also helping ensure societal access to critical legal services.
Courts responsible for the adoption of ethics rules can help ensure
reasoned decision-making in these rules’ development by applying
approaches that the courts already deploy in reviewing administrative agency
127. Id.
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rulemaking to the consideration of bar-drafted rules. In so doing, courts can
demand that the drafters provide notice of proposed rules to interested
stakeholders and give them a chance to comment on relevant topics. Perhaps
courts can even borrow from administrative law the concept of permitting
interested persons to file a petition for rulemaking, thereby allowing
interested stakeholders to ask a relevant rule drafting body for consideration
of new issues facing the legal profession.128 Courts might then have a
mechanism to review a failure of the rule drafting body to respond positively
to such a petition.129 State rulemaking bodies might thereby become more
responsive to the interests of members and even nonmembers in the bodies’
addressing of legal developments not reflected in the content of the ABA’s
Model Rules.130
Judicial demand for reasoned decision-making would likely push
participants in ethics rulemaking to conduct studies, research, and hearings
in order to provide reasoned justifications for rulemaking. Notice and
comment would aid in information gathering, as well as in giving interested
stakeholders an opportunity to raise new questions. By conditioning the
weight accorded to ethics opinions on the quality of processes used to
produce them, courts can similarly encourage ethics opinion committees to
adopt best practices, especially in issuing broad-based guidance that
predictably has effects comparable to those of a rule amendment itself.
Judicial review of administrative decisions provides a framework for
ensuring that legitimizing procedures are followed and that substantive
decisions are justified by the evidence. Extension of relevant aspects of the
standard administrative law framework to judicial oversight of ethics
rulemaking can provide incentives for relevant actors to improve the statebar-mediated processes for rulemaking for the legal profession.

128. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (“Each agency shall give an interested person the right to
petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”); id. § 555(e) (“Prompt notice shall
be given of the denial in whole or in part of a written application, petition, or other request of
an interested person made in connection with any agency proceeding. Except in affirming a
prior denial or when the denial is self-explanatory, the notice shall be accompanied by a brief
statement of the grounds for denial.”).
129. Administrative law’s reasoned decision-making requirement can be applied both to a
denial to take up a petitioned-for rulemaking and to any explanation (or lack of explanation)
for such a denial. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007) (emphasizing
that “once EPA has responded to a petition for rulemaking, its reasons for action or inaction
must conform to the authorizing statute”).
130. An example of such an area is alternative litigation financing. In the last twenty years,
non–law firm entities have sought to become investors in litigation by providing financial
support to clients by covering expenses or expenses and attorneys’ fees. These alternative
finance transactions raise many ethics questions involving confidentiality, attorney-client
privilege, control of the litigation, and conflicts of interest. See generally Bradley W. Wendel,
A Legal Ethics Perspective on Alternative Litigation Financing, 55 CAN. BUS. L. J. 133 (2014).
Although some state courts and state ethics opinions have addressed some of these issues, the
ABA has not considered this topic in its ethics codes.

